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1 Introduction
The astonishing rise of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) brought blockchain-based crypto-tokens
to the forefront of the policy, academic, and regulatory debate. In an ICO, a startup (or loose
groups of developers) raises capital by selling crypto-tokens to a wide pool of investors. The
first notable ICO was that of Ethereum in 2014, raising USD 2.3 million in approximately
12 hours. ICO activity exploded in 2017 and, especially, in 2018, with ICOs raising more
that USD 6 billion in a single month (July 2018, from Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti, 2018,
see Figure 1).1 However, these extraordinary events partially obscured a crucial fact: that
in the vast majority of cases, teams holding ICOs plan to profit from their work by selling
more tokens at a later stage. That is, the sale of tokens constitutes not only an innovative
fundraising mechanism, but also a novel way to profit from software development. This novel
form of seigniorage is the dominant business model in the blockchain sector.2
To illustrate how seigniorage can provide incentives for innovation, consider a population
of agents who wish to exchange either a good or a service, but are prevented from doing so
by the lack of the required infrastructure. If this exchange can occur in electronic form, then
the missing infrastructure may be a protocol, that is, the technical specifications governing
the communication between machines. Suppose a developer creates the missing protocol
and with it a decentralized digital platform (i.e., the peer-to-peer network of the users of the
protocol). This developer can profit from his innovation by simultaneously creating a token,
and by establishing that all exchanges that occur on the decentralized digital platform must
use this token. The token is therefore the internal currency of the platform. The developer
owns the initial stock of tokens so that, if the decentralized digital platform is successful,
there will be a positive demand for tokens, a positive price for tokens and positive profits
earned by the developer.
Blockchain enables seigniorage because it allows a developer to commit to a given supply
of tokens. This is because the rules determining whether (and how) the supply of tokens
increases over time can initially be specified within the protocol (see Section 2.1 for additional
1 For comparison, in 2016 total Venture Capital investment in Europe was USD 4.7 billion (OECD, 2017).
Note that, although far from its 2018 peak, ICOs continue to attract large investments. For example, between
January 2020 and September 2020, despite the economic turmoil cause by the pandemic, 7 ICOs were able
to raise more that 10M USD each, with one raising more than 100M USD (source: https://icodrops.com.)
2 At the time of writing, among the top-30 tokens by market capitaliztion, 23 are associated with projects
earning profits via seignorage. These tokens represent approximately 85% of the total crypto-market, with
the rest comprised for the most part of stable coins (tokens that are supposed to maintain a stable value
relative to a benchmark, for example the US dollar; data from www.coinmarketcap.com).
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Fig. 1: From Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti (2018) page 35: “This figure reports monthly values of the
number of ICOs that are able to raise funds (dashed blue line, left axis) and the total amount raised
across all ICOs each month (billions of dollars, right axis). The solid red line excludes the EOS ICO
in June 2018, while the dotted red line includes it. Monthly observations go from August 2015 to
August 2019. The observations reported for the month of August 2015 group all ICOs up to August
2015.”.
details on blockchain). If the protocol is open source—that is, its source code is publicly
available—this commitment is credible because anybody can verify the monetary policy
specified by the protocol. Of course, this type of commitment could be achieved by other
means, for example by complex institutional design (e.g., creating a “central bank”) or by
building reputation over time. But these alternatives are very expensive and not widely
available.3 Blockchain instead generates commitment by computer code. The downside is,
however, that blockchain-based protocols (like all open-source software) must be free to use.4
Hence, seigniorage is incompatible with traditional pricing.
In this paper I study a developer’s incentives to create a decentralized digital platform.
I do so by building a model in which a developer can sell tokens both to raise funds and to
then profit from his/her work. Crucially, the quality of the decentralized digital platform is
3 As a consequence, the only notable example of non-blockchain electronic currency that is freely ex-
changeable with dollars is the Linden Dollar (the currency of the game Second Life). Other non-blockchain
electronic currencies are those of online games like World of Warcraft. These currencies cannot be freely
exchanged with dollars.
4 This follows from Bertrand competition: if an open-source software is not free, a competitor or a group
of users could, at zero cost, launch an exact replica of the same software having lower or zero prices.
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endogenous: in every period, the developer exerts effort and invests in the development of
the platform, therefore improving its quality. Initially, the developer owns the entire stock
of tokens, and can sell some to investors via an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), modeled as an
auction. Subsequently, in every period, he can sell (or buy) tokens on a frictionless financial
market on which investors are also active.5 The developer can use the proceedings of the
sale of tokens to either invest in the development of the platform or to consume.
The first result is that, if investors are price takers, then in any post-ICO period there
is an anti-coordination problem. If investors expect the developer to develop the platform
in the future, this expectation should be priced into the token’s current price. But if this
is the case, then the developer is strictly better off by selling all of his tokens, which allows
him to “cash in” on future developments without doing any work. On the other hand, if
investors expect no development to occur, the price of the token will be low. The developer
should hold onto as many tokens as possible, exert effort and invest in the development of the
platform, so to increase the future price of the token. In every post-ICO period, therefore,
the equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price of the token is such that the developer is
indifferent between selling all of his tokens (and therefore not developing the platform) or
keeping a strictly positive amount of tokens (and therefore continuing the development of
the platform). The developer randomizes between these two options, in a way that leaves
investors indifferent between purchasing tokens in any given period.
When choosing whether and when to hold an ICO, the developer is therefore facing a
tradeoff. If he holds an ICO, in every subsequent period he may sell all of his tokens and
not develop the platform. Postponing the ICO, therefore, prevents the creation of a market
for tokens and works as a commitment device, because the developer will hold all of his
tokens for certain and set the corresponding level of effort and investment. However, if the
developer does not sell tokens at ICO, he may lack the funds to invest in the development of
the platform. As a consequence, the developer never wants to hold an ICO if his own assets
are sufficient to finance the optimum level of investment, but may hold an ICO otherwise.
The model delivers two main insights. The first one is that, as with other forms of
external financing, selling some tokens at ICO weakens the developer’s future incentives to
5 This feature of the model is justified by the observation that, absent a market for tokens, users could not
use the platform. This is one of the distinguishing features of tokens relative to other forms of financing, such
as, for example, equity. In a traditional business financed via equity, instead, trading equities can be made
more or less liquid for the company founders and managers (for example via provisions in the shareholders
agreement), independently from the ability of consumers to use the product.
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develop the platform, and therefore leads to inefficiencies. The interesting part of this result
is the specific form of this inefficiency: in every period after the ICO the developer may sell
all his tokens and stop the development of the platform. The second insight is more subtle
but more interesting. Even assuming that the developer can develop the decentralized digital
platform using exclusively his own funds (so that the first source of inefficiency is absent),
his level of effort and investment are set so as to maximize the value of his stock of tokens.
This value depends on the volume of the transaction occurring on the platform during a
given period of time.6 Instead, in the first best, effort and investment should be set so as to
maximize the present discounted value of the surplus generated by the platform.
Interestingly, the level of effort and investment set by the developer may be above or
below their first best levels. This depends on the discount factor and on the distribution
of the willingness to sell and to buy of the users using the platform to transact with each
other. The developer disregards the fact that the platform will be used and generate surplus
over multiple periods. Hence, if the discount factor is high (i.e., future payoffs have a large
present discounted value) then effort and investment are more likely to be below their first
best levels. In addition, when the elasticity of demand and supply on the platform are high,
total surplus is low, and with it the social return of effort and investments. In this case, the
equilibrium effort and investment are above their optimal level. On the other hand, if these
elasticities are high, the equilibrium effort and investment are below their optimal levels.7
The model delivers a number of other interesting results. For example, post-ICO there
may be multiple equilibria. Because of a cash constraint, the developer cannot invest in the
development of the platform more than his assets. It follows that the developer may sell
some of his tokens, as a way of accumulating assets to finance the future development of the
platform. The number of tokens that the developer needs to sell in order to finance future
investments depends on the current price for tokens, therefore generating a coordination
problem. If the price is high, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens, and his incentives to
invest and develop the software in the future are high. This, in turn, justifies the high price
for tokens today. If instead the price today is low, in order to finance future development,
6 This will result from an application of the equation of exchange, usually employed to link a country’s
price level, real GDP, money supply and velocity of money.
7 Interestingly, the elasticity of demand and supply also determine the choice between creating a traditional
platform or a decentralized digital platform, which I consider in an extension (Section 6.1). If the developer
creates a traditional platform, he will then earn a fraction of the surplus created (could be the totality if he
can perfectly price discriminate). If the elasticity of supply/demand are high, total surplus will be low and
the developer will prefer to create a decentralized digital platform. This seems to suggest that conditional
on creating a decentralized digital platform, effort and investment should be above their efficient levels.
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the developer needs to sell more tokens. But then his incentives to develop the software will
be low, which justifies the fact that the price is low today. Therefore, post-ICO there could
be multiple mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section provides the reader
with the necessary background information on blockchain, ICOs and seigniorage, and also
discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents a model of seigniorage. Section 4 solves
for its equilibrium. Section 5 illustrates the first best of the model and compares it to
its equilibrium. Section 6 discusses some extensions to the model, such as the possibility of
creating a traditional platform (instead of a decentralized digital platform) and the possibility
of raising funds from a Venture Capitalists (instead of via an ICO). Section 7 concludes.
Unless otherwise noted, all proofs and mathematical derivations missing from the text are
in the Appendix.
2 Background and relevant literature
2.1 Blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms and
seigniorage
In his seminal paper, Nakamoto (2008) introduced two innovations. The first one is Bit-
coin, a new digital currency. The second, more important, is the bitcoin protocol, an open-
source software allowing a network of anonymous, selfish participant to maintain a record
of Bitcoin transactions. Because these transactions are grouped into “blocks” that are then
“chained” (i.e., linked) together to form an immutable history, this technology became known
as blockchain. Importantly, the bitcoin protocol also regulates the total number of bitcoins
in every period, which is set to increase over time at a decreasing rate so to never exceed 21
millions. At the onset of Bitcoin (in early 2009), Nakamoto created and kept to himself ap-
proximately 1 million Bitcoin, before ceasing to contribute to the development of the Bitcoin
protocol in mid-2010.
Shortly after the introduction of Bitcoin, it became apparent that blockchain can be
used to maintain any type of record, not only financial records. It therefore quickly became
8 Clearly, if there are network effects, then there is an additional coordination problem: for a given sequence
of effort and investment by the developer, there could be both a “high adoption” and a “low adoption”
equilibrium. The novelty here is that, for a given adoption equilibrium, there are multiple equilibrium
sequences of effort and investment arising from a coordination problem between investors and the developer.
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the technological foundation of various other decentralized digital platform. In addition to
several cryptocurrencies (such as Monero, ZCash, Litecoin), there are now several decentral-
ized computing platforms (see Ethereum, EOS, Cardano, NEO);9 decentralized platforms
for real-time gross settlement (see Ripple, Stellar); decentralized marketplaces for storage
and hosting of files (see SIA, Filecoin, Storj), for renting in/out CPU cycles (see Golem),
for event or concert tickets (see Aventus), for e-books (see Publica); decentralized prediction
markets (see Augur, Gnosis); decentralized financial exchanges (see 0xproject); and many
more.
As already discussed, each platform must be used in conjunction with a specific token.
In case of decentralized marketplaces, the token is typically the internal currency of the
marketplace. Similarly, within decentralized computing platforms (e.g., Ethereum), the pro-
tocol native token (e.g., Ether) must be used to pay miners or validators for executing some
piece of software (called smart contracts). In the case of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin,
people who need to exchange Bitcoins reward those who process these transactions (called,
again, miners) in two ways. One is direct: the sender can directly pay some Bitcoins to the
miner to process his transaction faster. The second is indirect: the network awards miners
with new bitcoins for their work. Because of its effect on the price, this increase in the
supply of bitcoins amounts to a transfer from the holders of bitcoins to the miners.10 In
other blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms, the use of the token can be the most
diverse and the most complex.
If the token is necessary to use a decentralized digital platform, this token has positive
value as long as this platform is expected to have some usage in the future. Given this,
the developers behind a platform can sell some tokens to investors before completing its
development. One way to sell a token is via an ICO, which are typically well advertised.
Usually, tokens sold at ICO start trading on specialized financial exchanges shortly after the
end of the ICO.11 Importantly, developers can use these same exchanges to sell additional
9 A decentralized computing platforms can be seen as a virtual machine running over a network rather
than a single server. Developers can then create software (which in this context are smart contracts) that is
executed by the network as a whole rather than by a single machine.
10 See also Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017) and Easley, O’Hara, and Basu (2019).
11 Some ICOs “lock” their tokens for a period raging from few months to 2 years. During this period,
investors cannot trade tokens, although the emergence of future markets allowed sophisticated investors to
circumvent this limitation. At the expiration of the “lock” period—usually well before the development of
the platform is completed—trading tokens on specialized financial exchanges becomes possible. Note that, to
the extent that investors value liquidity, “locking” tokens impose a cost on them. It is possible that “locking”
tokens for too long may prevent a developer from raising sufficient funds at ICO.
2 Background and relevant literature 8
tokens after the ICO. With few exceptions,12 either token sales on the open market are
not disclosed, or they are discussed only within blog posts and informal communication.13
Despite the difference in visibility between these two ways of selling tokens Howell, Niessner,
and Yermack (2019) and Amsden and Schweizer (2018) show that projects that go through
an ICO sell only about half of their tokens at ICO, with the rest being kept by the founding
team. This indicates that projects that go through an ICO expect to sell as many tokens at
ICO as on the market post-ICO.
2.2 Relevant literature
This paper is closely related to corporate finance literature studying “large shareholders”. In
particular DeMarzo and Urošević (2006) consider a large shareholder who can exert effort
to improve the performance of a firm, and is active on the market together with a mass
of small investors. They find that, in equilibrium, the large shareholder will inefficiently
liquidate his holdings (either immediately or slowly over time). Also, they show that the
large shareholder may benefit from committing to a holding schedule. This is similar to
what happens in my model, in which, in equilibrium, the developer liquidates all tokens with
positive probability and, anticipating this, he may postpone the ICO. There are, however, a
number of differences between the problem studied here and that in DeMarzo and Urošević
(2006). The most prominent is that, here, the developer may sell tokens to raise funds to
invest in the development of the platform, in which case selling tokens increases the value
of the platform and its associated token. In DeMarzo and Urošević (2006), there is no such
investment and therefore selling shares always decreases the “large shareholders” effort and
the share price.14
We contribute to the literature on blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms by
studying the incentives faced by the creators of such platforms. We do so by assuming that
tokens are both a mean to raise funds and a mean to earn a profit, and that the quality of
12 For example, Ripple announces in advance a schedule for selling parts of its XRP stock, see https:
//ripple.com/insights/q1-2018-xrp-markets-report/ (accessed on July 24, 2020).
13 For example, see this blog post by the Ethereum foundation https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/07/
2394/ (accessed on July 24, 2020).
14 Also, from the modeling viewpoint, DeMarzo and Urošević (2006) assume symmetric information between
the large shareholder and investors, and hence abstract away from the most obvious sources of inefficiencies.
Here I make the same assumption. However, DeMarzo and Urošević (2006) assume that, in each period, first
the large shareholder chooses his shareholding, then investors set their demand/supply. They then consider
arbitrarily small periods, i.e., a continuous-time model. Here instead the developer and investors set their
demand/supply for tokens simultaneous, but the timing is discrete.
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the platform depends on the developer’s effort and investment.
With this respect, the most closely related papers are Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) and
Goldstein, Gupta, and Sverchkov (2019). Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) build a model in which
the owner of a decentralized digital platform continuously creates new tokens which can be
either sold (and the proceedings consumed) or used to pay workers who will improve the
value of the platform. In their model, the optimal monetary policy may require the owner to
buy back tokens, which can be done by raising costly external financing. The main result is
that, to avoid incurring such cost, the platform owner will create fewer tokens than optimal.
In Goldstein, Gupta, and Sverchkov (2019) an entrepreneur chooses whether to create a
decentralized digital platform or a traditional platform. If the entrepreneur creates a decen-
tralized digital platform he will hold an ICO and then sell additional tokens over time. In
this case, Goldstein et al. (2019) find that the entrepreneur optimally releases tokens over
time rather than all at once. Their main result is that creating a decentralized digital plat-
form allows the entrepreneur to commit to decentralization and competitive pricing rather
than monopoly pricing. Hence, if the distortion introduced by monopoly pricing (in terms of
reduction of equilibrium quantity exchanged) is large, the entrepreneur will prefer to create
a decentralized digital platform.
In contrast to both Cong et al. (2019) and Goldstein et al. (2019), I find that the developer
(also the entrepreneur and the platform owner) may sell too many tokens (that is, all of
them) on the market. The reason for this difference is that, in the model presented here,
the developer chooses not only how many tokens to sell, but also how much effort to exert
in the development the decentralized digital platform15 I also consider the choice between
creating a traditional platform (and hence charge monopoly pricing) and a decentralized
digital platform (Section 6.1). I find results that are in line with Goldstein et al. (2019),
but with some important differences. In particular, I provide conditions under which a non-
distortionary monopolist (i.e., a monopolist who can perfectly price discriminate) may prefer
to create a decentralized digital platforms. Hence, market distortions only partially explain
the choice between a traditional and a decentralized platform.
The rest of the literature studying blockchain tokens has focused on the ICO. This lit-
erature can be divided into two parts. Most closely related are papers studying the role of
tokens in decentralized digital platforms. Sockin and Xiong (2018), Cong, Li, and Wang
15 Both Goldstein et al. (2019) and Cong et al. (2019) abstract away from such effort. Note also how the
results in DeMarzo and Urošević (2006) (discussed earlier) also suggest that when a large “insider” can both
exert effort and trade on the market, in equilibrium he will sell too many tokens than optimal.
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(forthcoming), Bakos and Halaburda (2018), and Li and Mann (2018) argue that because of
network externalities there could be coordination failures in the adoption of a decentralized
digital platform. They study the role of tokens and they way they are sold in achieving the
high-adoption equilibrium. A second strand of literature has studied ICOs held by startups
that are not building decentralized digital platforms and may even completely unrelated to
blockchain. In this case, a token may represent a voucher and therefore give the right to
acquire a good or a service from the issuer, or may represent a claim on a business revenues,
or a combination of both. This use of blockchain-based tokens is studied in Catalini and
Gans (2018), Chod and Lyandres (forthcoming), Garratt and van Oordt (2019), Malinova
and Park (2018).
There is a growing literature building economic models to study how blockchain works
(see, for example Catalini and Gans, 2016; Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi, 2017; Dimitri,
2017; Prat and Walter, 2018; Ma, Gans, and Tourky, 2018; Budish, 2018). Within this
literature, closely related is Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2019), in which the
price of a token and incentives of Bitcoin miners are determined in the equilibrium of a game-
theoretic model. Also in my paper, prices and incentives are determined in equilibrium, but
the interest is in the incentives to develop the decentralized digital platform rather than
processing transactions. The portion of the model that determines the equilibrium price of
the token borrows heavily from Athey, Parashkevov, Sarukkai, and Xia (2017), who propose
an equilibrium model of the price of Bitcoin. The novelty with respect to their paper is that,
here, the demand for tokens is a function of the developer’s effort and investment, while
the “quality” of the Bitcoin protocol is taken as given in their model (but is unknown and
therefore discovered over time).
Gans and Halaburda (2015) study platform-based digital currencies, such as Facebook
credits and Amazon coins. These currencies share some similarities with the tokens discussed
in the Introduction, because they can be used to perform exchanges on a specific platform.
They are, however, controlled by their respective platforms, which decide on their supply
and the extent to which they can be traded or exchanged. This may explain why, despite
some initial concerns,16 these currencies have neither gained wide adoption, nor generated
significant profits for the platform issuing them.
16 See, for example “Could Facebook Credits ever compete with dollars and euros?” by
Matthew Yglesias on Slate, February 29, 2012 (available at https://slate.com/business/2012/02/
facebook-credits-how-the-social-networks-currency-could-compete-with-dollars-and-euros.html, accessed on
July 24, 2020).
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Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on innovation and incentives, in particular
to the literature studying the motivation behind contributions to open-source software (see
the seminal paper by Lerner and Tirole, 2002). In this respect, I show that open source—
with its organizational structure and ethos—can coexist with strong financial incentives. Of
course, an open question not addressed here is whether or not financial rewards will crowd
out other motives (see, for example, Benabou and Tirole, 2003); that is, whether the open
source ethos will be compromised by the introduction of strong financial incentives.
3 The model
The economy is composed of a developer, a large mass of risk-neutral price-taking investors
and a large mass of users. At the beginning of every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the developer
exerts effort et and invests it into the development of a blockchain-based decentralized digital
platform. The development of the protocol lasts T periods, after which the developer exits
the game and users start using the decentralized digital platform. The decentralized digital
platform can be used indefinitely. At the beginning of the game, the developer establishes
that all transactions on the decentralized digital platform must be conducted using a specific
token, with total supply M , fully owned by the developer. There is a common time-discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1)
In period to ≤ T , the developer sells some tokens to investors via an auction. This
stage is the ICO (Initial Coin Offering) stage, and its date to is chosen by the developer.
In each period after the ICO, but before the developer exits the game (that is, in every
t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}), first the developer exerts effort and invests, then a frictionless market
for tokens opens. In every period after the developer exits (that is, in every t > T ), first
the market for tokens opens and then users use the platform. See Figure 2 for a graphical
representation of the timeline.
Investors and the developer can also hold a risk-free asset yielding a per-period gross
return R ≥ 1. For ease of derivations, I assume that R = 1
β
.17
17 Hence, R is the steady-state rate of return of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model (with no
population growth or exogenous productivity growth). As we will see, this assumption is not essential for
the results but simplifies their derivation. Furthermore, although the model is solved in partial equilibrium
(i.e., for given R), it is useful to discuss the general equilibrium consequences of the creation of the platform
(see the Conclusion).
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1 ≤ t < to (pre-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
t = to (ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Auction for tokens
to < t ≤ T (post-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Market for tokens opens
The developer exits at the end of period T
t = T + 1
t+ 1
Market for tokens opens
Users use the platform
Fig. 2: Timeline
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit-maximizing speculators with no cash constraints.
They can purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequent period. Im-
portantly, when buying or selling tokens on the market, they are price takers: their net
demand for tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token prices from period t onward,
which they take as given.
Call pt the price of tokens in period t, which could be determined on the market or in an
ICO. Investors are indifferent between purchasing any amount of tokens in period t whenever
they expect the token to yield the risk-free return, that is whenever pt = maxs>t
{
E[ ps
Rs−t
]
}
.
If instead pt > maxs>t
{
E[ ps
Rs−t
]
}
, then the investors’ demand for token in period t is zero.
Finally, if pt < maxs>t
{
E[ ps
Rs−t
]
}
, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is not
defined.
The developer. Call Qt ∈ [0,M ] the stock of tokens held by the developer at the
beginning of period t. Recursively define
At ≡ (At−1 − it−1 + pt−1(Qt−1 −Qt))R
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the total resources available to the developer at the beginning of period t, where A1 is the
developer’s initial assets and the rest are resources earned from the sale of tokens in previous
periods, net of the investments made. Note that if pt−1(Qt−1 − Qt) > 0 then this term
represents the resources spent by the developer to purchase his own token on the market in
period t−1. If instead pt−1(Qt−1−Qt) < 0 then this term represents the resources earned by
selling additional tokens on the market in period 1. At the end of each period, the available
assets are invested at the risk-free rate.
The developer faces a per-period cash constraint establishing that the amount spent by
the developer (either as investment or to purchase tokens on the market) cannot exceed his
assets:
ptmax {Qt+1 −Qt, 0}+ it ≤ At. (1)
Because the developer cannot sell tokens before holding an ICO, there is also a feasibility
constraint
Qt ≡M for all t ≤ to.
In every period, the developer maximizes his assets at the end of period T (when he exits
the game) minus the disutility of effort. His problem can be rewritten in recursive form as,
for t < T :
Ut(Qt, At) ≡

maxQt,et,it
{−1
2
e2t + βUt+1(Qt+1, (At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it)R) + λt(At − it − ptmax {Qt+1 −Qt, 0})
}
if t ≥ to
maxet,it
{−1
2
e2t + βUt+1(M, (At − it)R)
}
, otherwise
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t cash constraint. Because in
period T the developer sells all his tokens for sure (either on the market or in an ICO) his
period-T problem is:
UT (QT , AT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
AT +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T + λT (AT − iT )
}
,
Finally, at the beginning of every period, if no ICO was held, the developer will decide
whether to hold one. The sequence of effort, investments and Qt are assumed observable by
investors and users.
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Users. In period T the development of the protocol stops, and users start using the decen-
tralized digital platform. Call q the price of the good (or service) exchanged on the platform,
expressed in fiat currency (for example USD). For ease of derivation, I introduce the following
functional forms for the supply and the demand on the platforms:
Assumption 1. The per-period demand and supply functions on the decentralized digital
platform are, respectively:
D˜(q)
T∑
t=1
τ(et, it) S˜(q)
T∑
t=1
τ(et, it).
S˜(q) is strictly increasing, D˜(q) is strictly decreasing, τ(., .) is increasing in both arguments,
concave in et, with limi→∞
{
∂τ(et,it)
∂it
}
= 0 for all et, and with τ(0, 0) = 0.
Hence, effort and investments increase both supply and demand proportionally and by
the same factor. The equilibrium price on the platform q∗, implicitly defined as
D˜(q∗) = S˜(q∗),
is independent of the sequence of effort and investment. The elasticity of demand and supply
are independent of the developer’s effort and investment. Effort and investment however
determine the volume of exchanges occurring at price q∗. For ease of notation, I define
f(et, it) ≡ τ(et, it)D˜(q∗)q∗,
so that the total value (in US dollars) of all exchanges occurring on the decentralized digital
platform during a given period is
VT ≡
T∑
s=1
τ(et, it)D˜(q
∗)q∗ =
T∑
s=1
f(es, is). (2)
I call the above quantity the value of the decentralized digital platform.
Assumption 1 is meant to capture in a parsimonious way the fact that the developer’s
effort and investment generates an improvement of the protocol (i.e., lower transaction costs,
more ease of use, increased security, and reliability), which in turns induces more users to
use the platform to perform more/larger transactions. Being parsimonious, however, it also
abstracts away from important elements. For example, because of network externalities, it
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is possible that for a given sequence of effort and investment there is both a “high adoption”
equilibrium (in which the value of the decentralized digital platform is high) and a “low
adoption” equilibrium (in which the value of the decentralized digital platform is low). With
a minimal loss of generality, the reader can interpret VT as the value of the decentralized
digital platform in one of these equilibria, the one that the developer expects to emerge.18
Finally, each user can access the market for tokens only once in every period.19 This
implies that, in every t > T , those who use the protocol to purchase goods and services have
a demand for tokens in period t equal to VT
pt
, while those who use the protocol to sell goods
or services have a supply of tokens in period t+ 1 equal, again, to VT
pt
.
4 Solution
4.1 Periods t ≥ T
I start by solving for the price of tokens from period T onward. The fact that no development
is possible after period 2 implies that the price of tokens must be constant from period T
onward. Investors are therefore unwilling to hold tokens, and the entire stock of tokens M
is used by users to transact on the platform. Because in period t ≥ T , the demand of tokens
by users is VT
pt
, the equilibrium price of tokens must be:
pT =
VT
M
. (3)
Because the supply of tokens in all following period is again M , and the demand is again
VT
pt
, the above is the price of tokens in every period from T onward.
Equation 3 is an adaptation of the equation of exchange, which is usually employed to
link a country’s price level (here the price of the token relative to “fiat” currency), real GDP
(here VT ), money supply (here the number of tokens available for transacting on the platform
M) and velocity of money (here assumed equal to 1). For our purposes, the important
implication is that VT — and hence the price at which the developer can sell his token — is
18 The loss of generality is that either the “high” or the “low” adoption equilibrium may not exist for some
sequences of effort and investment, generating a discontinuity in the way effort and investment maps into
the value of the decentralized digital platform.
19 That is, the token has velocity 1. Assuming a different, exogenous velocity will introduce an additional
parameter without affecting the results. See Prat, Danos, and Marcassa, 2019 for a model in which the
velocity of the token in endogenous.
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strictly increasing in the sequence of effort and investments made by the developer. As we
will see, this motivates the developer to exert effort and invest.
4.2 The developer’s problem
We start by deriving a useful lemma. This lemma is based on the observation that, in
equilibrium, between period t0 and T holding tokens must generate a return equal to the
risk-free return R:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, in every period to ≤ t ≤ T , the price of tokens is
pt =
E[pT ]
RT−t
=
∑t
s=1 f(es, is) +
∑T
s=t+1E[f(es, is)]
MRT−t
(4)
An important observation is that what is known by investors—and hence is used to
compute the expectation about the developer’s future effort and investment—depends on
whether t = to (i.e., the tokens are sold at ICO) or t > to (i.e., the tokens are sold on the
market). The ICO is modeled as an auction, in which the developer announces the supply
of tokens and investors submit bids. The developer’s announcement is used to compute
the future expected effort and investment, and hence determines the token price at ICO.
On the market, instead, investors are price takers, which implies that in every t > to their
demand for tokens depends exclusively on current and future (expected) prices, and not on
the quantity of tokens sold by the developer in period t.20 To say it differently, in period
t > to investors form an expectation with respect to future effort and investment. This
expectation is correct in equilibrium (that is, for the equilibrium supply of tokens in period
t) but will not react to deviations from the equilibrium. From the developer’s view point,
therefore, in every period t > to, the equilibrium price for tokens does not depend on the
amount of tokens sold in that period. However, as we will see, the supply of tokens in period
t determines the developer’s effort and investment in period t + 1. Hence, the amount of
tokens sold by the developer in a given period affect the price of tokens in all subsequent
periods.
It is useful to solve the developer’s problem by considering two cases. The first is the “rich
developer” case, in which the developer’s initial assets A1 are sufficient to cover the optimal
level of investment in every period. In this case, the cash constraint is never binding and
20 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point is simply that in a
price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
4 Solution 17
can be ignored. The second case is that of a “poor developer”, in which the cash constraint
is binding for at least one period.
4.2.1 Rich developer
If the cash constraint is never binding, the developer’s maximization problem does not depend
on the assets available in every period. It is therefore possible to rewrite the objective
function as, for t ≤ T − 1:
U˜t(Qt) ≡ max
Qt+1,et,it
{
−1
2
e2t + βU˜t+1(Qt+1)
}
,
and for t = T :
U˜T (QT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
T−1∑
t=1
[(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it]RT−t +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T
}
.
Note that
∑T−1
t=to
[(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it] is the cash generated between period 1 and T −1 (net
of investment) which is invested in the risk free asset. Because the developer liquidates all
his tokens in period T , then QT · pT − iT is the cash generated in period T .
Lemma 1 allows to compute optimal effort and optimal investment in any period t:21
e∗(Qt) ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗(Qt))
Qt
M
− 1
2
e2
}
(5)
i∗(Qt) ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗(Qt), i)
Qt
M
− i
}
. (6)
Note that, by Lemma 1, effort and investment in period t increase the price of tokens
in every subsequent period, but because the price must increase at rate R, this effect is
stronger in later periods. At the same time, because of discounting, payoffs earned in the
distant future are less valuable from today’s viewpoint. Because βR = 1 the two effects
cancel out, so that optimal effort and investment depend exclusively on Qt and not on the
specific time period t.22
21 Under the assumptions made on f(., .) optimal effort and investment must exist. However, they may not
be unique. In what follows, for ease of exposition, I implicitly assume that they are indeed unique, although
no result depends on this assumption.
22 If instead βR > 1, for given token holdings, effort will be high in earlier periods and decrease over time,
while if βR < 1 effort will be low in earlier periods and increase over time. This effect is purely mechanical,
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Furthermore, Qt and et are complements in the developer’s objective function. This,
by Topkis’ theorem, implies that e∗(Qt) is an increasing function. Similarly, Qt and it are
complements in the developer’s objective function, which implies that i∗(Qt) is an increasing
function. At the same time, e∗(0) = i∗(0) = 0. There are therefore two possible cases. The
first one is trivial: e∗(Qt) and i
∗(Qt) are equal to zero for all Qt ≤ M . The second case
is non-trivial: both e∗(Qt) and i
∗(Qt) are increasing in Qt, strictly so somewhere. In what
follows, I focus exclusively on the non-trivial case.
To solve for the optimal choice of Qt+1, as a preliminary step I characterize the shape of
U˜(Qt).
Lemma 2. For all t ∈ {to, ..., T}
∂2U˜(Qt)
∂Q2t
≥ 0,
with strict inequality for some Qt ≤M .
Hence, in every period, the developer’s utility function is convex in Qt, strictly so some-
where. For intuition, note that if the price of tokens is constant in every period, then
∀t ∈ {to, ...T}, U˜(Qt) grows linearly in Qt. However, we know that as Qt increases effort
and investment will also increase, and with them the price of tokens. Because effort and
investment are chosen optimally, U˜(Qt) must grow faster than linearly in Qt.
Consider now the choice of how many tokens to sell on the market. In period T , quite
trivially, the developer will sell all his tokens at price given by (3). Consider therefore a
period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T − 1}. In such period, the developer can sell any amount of tokens
at the equilibrium market price pt. Hence, the instantaneous opportunity cost of holding
(i.e., not selling) tokens is linear. By the above lemma, the continuation value of holding
tokens is instead positive and convex (strictly so somewhere). It follows that, in every
t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T − 1} the optimal choice of Qt+1 must be a corner solution: either the
developer sells all his tokens (i.e. Qt+1 = 0), or the developer holds on to all his tokens (i.e.
Qt+1 = M), or he randomizes between these two options.
Note, however, that if in equilibrium we have Qt+1 = 0 with probability 1, then investors
should expect no effort nor investment in the following period. This implies that pt should
be low. But if pt is low, then the developer is better off to hold on to his tokens until next
period (i.e. choose Qt+1 = M). If instead in equilibrium we have Qt+1 = M with probability
1, then investors expect high effort and investment in the future. In this case, today’s price
which is why I focus on the case βR = 1.
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for tokens will incorporate this expectation. The developer should sell all his tokens today so
to benefit from the expectation of his future effort and investment without actually exerting
any effort or making any investment. Thus, we have an anti-coordination problem, which
implies that the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price will be such that the
developer is indifferent, and will randomize between Qt+1 = 0 and Qt+1 = M , as the next
proposition shows.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to+1, ..., T − 1} the developer
sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = 0) with probability
α =
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(7)
and purchases all tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability 1− α. The price of tokens as
a function of past effort and investment is
pt =
∑t
s=1 f(es, is) + (1− α)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
RT−tM
. (8)
For intuition, note that (e∗(M))2/2+ i∗(M) is the cost generated by holding M tokens in
period t, coming from the additional effort and investment that the developer will exert in
period t+1. Instead, f(e∗(M), i∗(M)) is the benefit of holdingM tokens in period t, coming
from the increase in the value of these tokens due to the developer’s effort and investment in
period t+ 1. α is therefore equal to the ratio between cost and benefit of holding M tokens
in period T . Because effort and investment are chosen optimally, the benefit should be at
least as large as the cost, and therefore α ≤ 1.
Equation (8) can also be interpreted as the law of motion of the price, because it implies
that, in every period t ≤ T , the price of token will increase by:
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M ·R ,
with probability:
1− e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
,
and will decrease by:
1
M ·R
(
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))− (e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M))) ,
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otherwise.
Period to (the ICO) is characterized by the fact that tokens are sold via an auction. Again,
if to = T then the developer will sell all his tokens at price given by (3). If instead to < T , at
ICO (and contrary to all subsequent periods) the price of a token depends on the number of
tokens sold, which isM−Qto . The next proposition shows that, if to < T , then the developer
chooses not to sell any token at ICO. The intuition is quite straightforward: the more tokens
the developer sells at ICO, the lower future effort and investment will be. Because investors
must be indifferent between purchasing at ICO or in the subsequent period, this implies that
selling tokens at ICO lowers the price of the token at ICO and in all subsequent periods.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium at to). If the ICO occurs before T , then the developer does not
sell any tokens at ICO. It follows that Qto+1 = M with probability 1. Effort and investment
in all t ≤ to +1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1. If instead the ICO occurs at period
T , then the developer sells all of his tokens at ICO.
Period to + 1 is therefore the only period in which the market for tokens is open and the
developer contributes to the development of the protocol with probability 1.
With respect to the optimal timing of the ICO, the previous proposition shows that
optimal effort and investment between period 1 and to + 1 are e
∗(M) and i∗(M). In all
subsequent periods, instead, the existence of the market for tokens creates a commitment
problem: the value of the decentralized digital platform is maximized when the developer
holds M tokens in every period until T . In equilibrium, instead, from period to + 2 onward
the developer exerts effort and invests with probability 1− α < 1. Hence, if the ICO occurs
in period to < T − 1, then, from period t ≤ to viewpoint, the developer’s expected payoff is
Vt−1+
to+1∑
s=t
(
f (e∗(M), i∗(M))− 1− βs−t (e
∗(M))2
2
)
+(1−α)
T∑
s=to+2
(
f (e∗(M), i∗(M))− 1− βs−t (e
∗(M))2
2
)
.
If instead the ICO happens in period T − 1 or in period T , the developer’s payoff is23
Vt−1 +
T∑
s=t
(
f (e∗(M), i∗(M))− 1− βs−t (e
∗(M))2
2
)
23 Note that if the ICO is held in period T − 1, the developer will auction off 0 tokens, and will sell M
tokens on the market in period T . If instead the ICO is in period T , the developer will sell all of his tokens
via the auction. Holding the ICO in period T − 1 or period T , therefore, achieves the same outcome: the
developer does not sell any tokens before period T and sells all of his tokens in period T .
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Because effort and investment are chosen optimally, it must be that
f (e∗(M), i∗(M)) >
(e∗(M))2
2
+ 1,
which implies that the developer’s payoffs is maximized when the ICO is postponed to either
period T or period T − 1. The following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium to). The developer holds the ICO either in period T or in period
T − 1.
Proof. In the text.
By postponing the ICO, the developer can commit to set high effort and investment in
all future periods. Doing so maximizes the value of the decentralized digital platform and
also the value of the developer’s stock of tokens. As a consequence, in equilibrium, effort
and investment are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1 in every period.
Corollary 1. The cash constraint is never binding (and hence we are in the “rich developer”
case) if and only if A1 ≥
∑T
t=1
i∗(M)
Rt−1
.
Proof. Immediate from the above Proposition.
That is, we are in the “rich developer” case whenever the developer does not need to sell
tokens to finance the optimal amount of investment for T periods.
A final observation is that neither the developers’ utility nor the value of the platform
depend on the total stock of tokens M . From (5) and (6) we know that the equilibrium
sequence of effort and investment depends on M exclusively via the share of tokens held by
the developer. This share is 1 for t ≤ to, and can be either 1 or 0 for to < t ≤ T (with
the probability of being 1 or 0 given by 7, also independent from M). This implies that VT
and, as a consequence, ptM are independent from M . The developer’s utility is therefore
independent of M .
4.2.2 Poor developer
The rich developer case focuses on one side of seigniorage: the incentives provided to the
developer. It shows that the developer will hold the ICO just before exiting the game, as
a way to commit to the highest level of effort and investment in every period. There is,
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however, a second side of seigniorage: the ability to channel funds from investors to the
developer, to be then used in the development of the protocol. I now introduce this aspect
into the model by assuming that the developer is “poor”, in the sense that A1 <
∑T
t=1
i∗(M)
Rt−1
:
the developer cannot invest efficiently in all periods, and the cash constraint could be binding.
To focus on the role of the cash constraint, I introduce the following functional form:
f(e, i) ≡ e · 1{i ≥ i}, (A1)
where 1{} is the indicator function. The choice of optimal investment, therefore, simplifies
to the choice between two levels: i and 0. If there is positive investment, then effort increases
the value of the decentralized digital platform linearly. I furthermore assume that the fixed
cost is not too large:
i <
1
2
. (A2)
As it will become clear later, the above assumption eliminates trivial equilibria in which
there is never positive effort nor investment.
The next proposition shows that, also here, in all post-ICO periods (except for T ) the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to+1, ..., T} the developer sets
effort and investment equal to
e∗(Qt, At) ≡


Qt
M
if it ≥ i
0 otherwise
(9)
i∗(Qt, At) ≡

i if i ≤
1
2
(
Qt
M
)2
and i ≤ At
0 otherwise.
(10)
In period T the developer sells all his tokens with probability 1. In periods t ∈ {to+1, ..., T−1},
instead, there are several possible equilibria:
• There is a “low” equilibrium in which the developer chooses Qt+1 = 0, so that subsequent
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effort and investment are zero.24 Such equilibrium exists if and only if
Vt
(
Qt
M
−
√
2¯i
)
< i+R(i∗(Qt, At)− At).
• There is a “high” equilibrium in which the developer sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 =
0) with probability α and holds on to all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability
1− α, where
α =
1
2
+ i.
Such equilibrium exists if and only if
(
Vt +
1
2
− i
)(
1− Qt
M
)
≤ R(At − i∗(Qt, At))− i.
• There is a “medium” equilibrium in which the developer chooses Qt+1 = 0 with proba-
bility α and Qt+1 = Q
∗
t+1 < M with probability 1− α, where
α =
1
2
+ i
(
M
Q∗t+1
)2
.
Such equilibrium exists if and only if Q∗t+1 solution to
Q∗t+1 = Qt −
i+R(i∗(Qt, At)− At)
Vt
M
+
Q∗t+1
2M2
− i
Q∗t+1
lies in
[
M
√
2¯i,M
]
.
An equilibrium always exists. If R(At − i∗(Qt, At)) ≥ i, the equilibrium is unique, and is
either a “high” equilibrium or a “medium” equilibrium. If R(At− i∗(Qt, At)) < i instead there
can be multiple equilibria: a low equilibrium as well as multiple “medium” equilibra might
exist.
Also here, when the market for tokens is open, there is the same anti-coordination problem
discussed in the “rich developer” case. If investors expect the developer to hold a sufficient
number of tokens for sure, then the current price should reflect future effort and investment.
24 The developer could also set Qt+1 small but not exactly zero. As long as the subsequent effort and
investment are zero, this would also be an equilibrium.
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But given this the developer should sell all his tokens today. Similarly, if investors expect
the developer to sell all his tokens, the price of tokens should be low. But given this, the
developer should hold on a positive amount of tokens. Hence, also here, in equilibrium the
developer will randomize between selling all tokens and holding the maximum amount of
tokens.
Here, however, the maximum amount of tokens the developer can keep may be determined
by the cash constraint. If this constraint is binding, then Q∗t+1 < M is the largest token
holdings allowing the developer to invest optimally in the following period. Importantly, if
Q∗t+1 is too low (more precisely Q
∗
t+1 < M
√
2¯i) then a developer setting Qt+1 = Q
∗
t+1 will
not want to invest in period t+ 1 despite being able to do so.
The important observation is that Q∗t+1 may not be uniquely determined, and hence there
could be multiple equilibria. When R(At−i∗(Qt, At)) < i, after investing optimally in period
t, the developer does not have enough funds to invest also in period t+1. Hence, the developer
needs to sell tokens on the market to be able to invest in the following period. In this case,
there could be a “low” equilibrium next to multiple “medium” equilibria. This equilibrium
multiplicity arises from a coordination problem between the developer and investors. There
could be an equilibrium in which investors expect future effort to be high, driving up pt.
Given this, the developer will be able to finance future investments while simultaneously
holding a large fraction of tokens (i.e., Q∗t+1 is high). As a consequence, future expected
effort will be high. Next to this equilibrium, there could be one in which investors expect
future effort to be low (or zero), which implies that pt is low. In this equilibrium, the
developer needs to sell many tokens to finance future investment (i.e., Q∗t+1 is low), and
therefore future expected effort will be low or even zero.
If instead R(At − i∗(Qt, At)) ≥ i, after investing optimally in period t, the developer
has enough funds to invest also in period t + 1. In this case, the developer may purchase
additional tokens on the market. The equilibrium is always unique, and could be either a
“high” equilibrium, or a “medium” equilibrium. Finally, note that because of this multiplicity
of equilibria, it is not possible to write down the law of motion of the price for tokens. Such
law of motion can be specified only by first defining which equilibrium is expected to emerge
in every period.
Consider now period to (the ICO).
Proposition 5. In every t ≤ to, optimal effort and investment are again given by (9) and
(10).
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If to = T , the developer sell all his tokens at ICO..
If to < T and R(Ato − i∗(Qto , Ato)) ≥ i, then the developer does not sell any token at
ICO, so that, in equilibrium, Qto+1 = M .
If to < T and R(Ato − i∗(Qto , Ato)) < i, then define Q˜ as the largest solution to
Ato +
(
M − Q˜
)
RT−to
·
(
Vto
M
+
Q˜
M2
)
− i∗(Qto , Ato) = iR−1.
If Q˜ ∈
[
M
√
2¯i,M
]
, then in equilibrium Qto+1 = Q˜. Effort and investment will be strictly
positive in period to+1. If instead either Q˜ does not exist or Q˜ < M
√
2¯i, then any Qto+1 ≤M
is an equilibrium. In this case, there is no effort nor investment in period to + 1.
Remember that, if t0 < T , then there is at least one period of development after the ICO.
Because effort and investments are increasing in the amount of tokens held by the developer,
and the price at ICO is proportional to that in the following period, the price for tokens
at ICO is decreasing in the amount of tokens sold at ICO. Hence, the value of the stock of
tokens M is decreasing in the amount of tokens sold at ICO.
Hence, similarly to the rich developer case, the developer will want to sell as few tokens
as possible at ICO. If R(Ato − ito) ≥ i, then the developer will be able to invest optimally in
period to+1 without selling any token at ICO—which is therefore the equilibrium like in the
rich developer case. If instead R(Ato − ito) < i, to invest optimally in the following period,
the developer needs to sell some tokens at ICO. But if the amount of tokens to be sold is
too large, then in the following period the developer has no incentive to invest. In this case,
the only possible equilibrium is one in which there is no investment nor effort following the
ICO.
Hence, similarly to the “rich developer” case, also here the equilibrium at ICO is unique
and in pure strategy. Also, period to + 1 may be the only period in which the market for
tokens is open and the developer invests and exerts effort with probability 1. However, here
the ICO may be unsuccessful—in the sense that the developer is unable to raise funds. This
is more likely to happen when the developer’s own funds Ato are low, and the cost of investing
i is large.
With respect to the timing of the ICO, if the developer has enough resources to invest,
then the logic discussed in the “rich developer case” applies here as well: the developer will
not hold an ICO so to optimally invest in every period. The developer will hold the ICO
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as soon as his resources are insufficient to invest, so to continue the development of the
platform. I summarize this observation in the following remark.
Remark 1. In equilibrium, the developer holds the ICO in period to = max{s|
∑s
t=1
i
Rt
≤
A1}.
Hence, by Proposition 4, when the market for tokens is open, there can be a “medium”
or a “low” equilibrium (or both) but never a “high” equilibrium. This implies that, for t ≤ to
we have Q∗t = M , while for t > to we have Q
∗
t < M .
Finally, also here the equilibrium is independent ofM . The above remark shows that the
timing of the ICO does not depend on M . Similarly (9) and (10) show that optimal effort
and investment depend on the share of tokens held by the developer. Furthermore, the share
of tokens held by the developer in equilibrium does not depend on M—see the definition of
Q∗t+1 in Proposition 4 and the definition of Q˜ in Proposition 5. This implies that, in every
period t, the value of the platform Vt as well as the total value of the stock of tokens pt ·M
is independent of M .
5 First best
In the first best, effort and investment are set to maximize the present discounted value of
the social welfare generated by the platform. Here we consider the social welfare generated
by the platform in every period to be sum of producer and consumer surplus, that is:25
SUR =
T∑
t=1
f(et, it)
D˜(q∗)q∗
(∫
∞
q∗
D˜(q)dq +
∫ q∗
0
S˜(q)dq
)
.
Social welfare is therefore:
SW ≡ 1
1− βSUR
There are a number of differences between the first best and the equilibrium. To start, the
developer may be poor, in which case he may liquidate all his tokens and as a consequence
exert no effort nor invest—which is inefficient. But even assuming that the developer is rich,
a second source of inefficiency emerges. In the first best, the platform generates a benefit for
its users in every period, and the social welfare is the present discounted value of this benefit.
25 This is the case if users’ utilities are quasilinear and the marketplace created by the decentralized digital
platform is perfectly competitive.
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However, because the developer can sell the same token only once, he will only consider the
impact of his effort/investment on the volume of transactions in the period in which he plans
to sell it. The developer is therefore shortsighted, because he only considers the impact of his
action in period T rather than in all subsequent periods. Finally, the developer maximizes
the value of the platform, which depends on the willingness to pay/sell of the marginal
buyer/seller. Social welfare instead depends on the willingness to pay/sell of all market
participants, including the infra-marginal ones. Depending on whether equilibrium effort
and investment affect mostly the marginal or the inframarginal buyer/seller, equilibrium
effort and investment could be above or below their first best level.
More formally, the private and social benefit of effort and investment are, respectively:
∂VT
∂et
=
∂f(et, it)
∂et
∂VT
∂it
=
∂f(et, it)
∂it
∂SW
∂et
=
1
1− β
∂f(et, it)
∂et
∫
∞
q∗
D˜(q)dq +
∫ q∗
0
S˜(q)dq
D˜(q∗)q∗
∂SW
∂it
=
1
1− β
∂f(et, it)
∂it
∫
∞
q∗
D˜(q)dq +
∫ q∗
0
S˜(q)dq
D˜(q∗)q∗
.
Equilibrium effort and investment will be above their first best levels whenever
∫
∞
q∗
D˜(q)dq +
∫ q∗
0
S˜(q)dq < (1− β)D˜(q∗)q∗
or
SUR < (1− β)VT ,
and will be below otherwise.
Figure 3 illustrates the two cases. In both cases VT is constant, but in the first one the
demand and the supply are less elastic than in the second case. As a consequence, surplus
is large in the first case, but small in the second one. As it is clear, if demand and supply
are sufficiently elastic, surplus will be arbitrarily small, and hence equilibrium effort and
investment will be above the efficient level. If instead they are sufficiently inelastic, surplus
will be large and therefore equilibrium effort and investment will be below the efficient level.
The following Proposition summarizes there observations (its proof is omitted).
Proposition 6. Consider the rich developer case. For given D˜(q∗)q∗, if either β is suf-
ficiently high or supply and demand are sufficiently inelastic, then equilibrium effort and
investment will be inefficiently low. If instead β is sufficiently low and supply and demand
are sufficiently elastic, then equilibrium effort and investment will be inefficiently high.
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Fig. 3: Left panel: low elasticity of demand/supply, CS > VT and hence there is under-
investment and under-provision of effort. Right panel: high elasticity of de-
mand/supply, CS is arbitrarily small and hence there is over-investment and over-
provision of effort.
To conclude, remember that in the poor developer case, after ICO, the developer invests
and exerts effort with probability less than one. Furthermore, conditional on exerting effort,
because in every period he holds less than the full stock of tokens, his level of effort and
investment are lower than in the rich developer case. Hence, if there is under-provision of
effort / under-investment when the developer is rich, the same holds when the developer is
poor. But if there is over-provision of effort / over-investment when the developer is rich,
this may not be the case when the developer is poor.
6 Discussion
6.1 Decentralized vs traditional platform
Suppose that the developer can choose between creating a standard platform or a decen-
tralized digital platform. I start by considering an extreme case in which, if the developer
creates a standard platform, he can then perfectly price discriminate: he can charge every
seller his willingness to sell, and every buyer his willingness to buy. In this case, for given
sequence of effort and investment, the market equilibrium is efficient, that is total surplus is
maximized. The entire surplus is earned by the developer as profits, while buyers and sellers
earn zero.
It turns out that, also in this extreme case, the developer may be better off creating
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a decentralized digital platform rather than a traditional platform. In case he creates a
traditional platform, the developer payoff in period T is:
1
1− βSUR,
while in case he creates a decentralized digital platform his payoff in period T is VT . The
derivations in the previous section show that, for every sequence of effort and investment,
SUR tends to zero as demand/supply become more elastic. In this case the developer is
better off by creating a decentralized digital platform.
If the developer/monopolist cannot perfectly price discriminate then two things will hap-
pen. First, the prices charged by the monopolist will be distortionary, and hence total surplus
will decrease. At the same time, some buyers and sellers may earn positive payoffs. As a
consequence, the monopolist’s total profits are now below 1
1−β
SUP . The developer’s payoff
in case he creates a decentralized digital currency is again VT . This implies that, again, the
developer will prefer to crease a decentralized digital platform when the elasticity of demand
and supply is high.26
I summarize these observations in the following remark:
Remark 2. Suppose that the developer can choose between creating a decentralized digital
platform and a traditional platform. If, after creating a traditional platform, he can perfectly
price discriminate, then he will create a decentralized digital platform if and only if
1
1− βSUR < VT ,
which is more likely to hold when supply and demand are elastic. If instead he cannot perfectly
price discriminate, he will create a decentralized digital platform if the above condition holds,
but also in cases in which the above condition is violated but SUR is sufficiently low.
Finally, note that Proposition 6 together with the above remark imply that, if the devel-
oper can perfectly price discriminate, upon observing the creation of a decentralized digital
26 This is related but not identical to Goldstein et al. (2019), who argue that by creating a decentral-
ized digital platform, an entrepreneur commits not to use his monopoly power to distort future allocation.
The difference is that, here, also in case in which monopoly pricing is not distortionary (i.e., perfect price
discrimination) the developer may prefer to create a decentralized digital platform. Hence, the distortion
introduced by monopoly power explains only partially the choice of whether to have a decentralized digital
platform or a monopoly. I believe this is due to the fact in Goldstein et al. (2019) the token price at the end
of the developer’s life is exogenously given, while here this price is endogenous and depends on the volume
of transactions on the platforms.
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platform, we should infer that effort and investment are above their efficient levels (at least
in the rich developer case). If instead the developer cannot perfectly price discriminate,
there are also cases in which a decentralized digital platform is created and then there is
under-provision of effort and investment.
6.2 Traditional investor
In the rich developer case, the developer uses his own resources to finance the investment
in the protocol, so that seigniorage plays a role exclusively because it generates profits
and provides incentives. In the poor developer case, seigniorage has the additional role of
providing resources to be invested into the development of the protocol. The comparison
between the two cases shows that the use of seigniorage to finance the investment in the
protocol is a second-best response to the developer’s lack of resource, because the value of
the decentralized digital platform (and the developer’s payoff) is always higher in the rich
developer case.
This observation suggests that an external investor (call it a traditional investor, possibly
a venture capital fund or a business angel) could provide capital to the developer so as to
move from the poor developer to the rich developer case.27 Under perfect contracting,
therefore, in the poor developer case the traditional investor would always provide funds to
the developer. If instead the traditional investor and the developer are constrained in the
type of contracts they can sign—for example because effort is not contractible—then the
external investor may not provide funds even if it is welfare improving to do so. In this case,
the development of the platform can only be financed by holding an early ICO (i.e., an ICO
before period T − 1).
To illustrate this point, assume that the developer and the investor are limited to con-
tracts of the following type: the investor provides an amount of cash equal to I at the
beginning of the game, and receives a fraction of tokens ρ at ICO. If I is sufficiently large,
such a contract has the advantage of postponing the ICO, and therefore extending the period
in which the developer develops the protocol with probability 1. However, it also implies that
27 Regarding the fact that traditional investors are investing in companies that subsequently run
an ICO, see https://www.cbinsights.com/research/blockchain-ico-equity-financing-vc-investments/
(accessed on July 24, 2020) and https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-03/
hedge-funds-flip-icos-leaving-other-investors-holding-the-bag (accessed on July 24, 2020). See also a
recent paper by Chod and Lyandres (ming), who compare traditional venture capital financing with
financing via ICO under the assumption that they are perfect substitutes, and derive conditions under
which one dominates the other.
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in every period of development the level of effort and investment will be reduced, because the
developer anticipates that his payoff will be (1 − ρ)MpT . Clearly, there are cases in which
the outside investment will not happen. For example, if the developer already has enough
funds to invest efficiently in the first T − 2 periods , then external financing allows to invest
and exert effort with probability 1 in one extra period, at the expense of reducing the level
of investment and effort during T periods. If T is very large, then the developer may choose
to hold the ICO in period T − 2 rather than accepting I from the external investor.
Overall, introducing a traditional investor is welfare-increasing: when a contract between
the developer and the investor is signed, it must be the case that the value of the decentralized
digital platform increases (relative to no outside investment). But contractual frictions may
prevent the traditional investor and the developer from finding an agreement. In this case,
the developer may hold an early ICO.
6.3 Asymmetric information
The results derived above largely extend to a situation in which the developer’s productivity
is private information. In this case, if the market for tokens is open, for a given price for
tokens there is a threshold productivity above which the developer wants to hold all tokens,
and below which the developer wants to sell all tokens. In every period, if the developer
is more productive that the market expectation, he will purchase tokens and develop the
protocol with probability 1. If the developer is less productive than the market expectation,
he will sell all tokens and not develop the protocol.
The important observation is that the productivity of the developer will be revealed
over time. In the moment it is fully revealed, the equilibrium of the game is again the one
derived in the previous section. Asymmetry of information therefore implies that developers
with above average productivity may contribute to the development of the protocol with
probability 1 for some periods. Conversely, developers with below average productivity do
not contribute to the protocols initially. After the developer’s productivity is revealed, he
will contribute with probability less than 1, as in the symmetric information case.
6.4 Multiple, heterogeneous developers
Suppose that there is a population of developers indexed by j, each characterized by a
productivity parameter qjt (commonly known) so that effort and investment by developer j
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in period t generates an increase in the value of the decentralized digital platform equal to
qjt f(e
j
t , i
j
t). If all developers are “rich” (that is, the cash constraint is never binding for any
developer) and there is a market for tokens, then in every period t the equilibrium price must
be such that the developer with the largest qit+1 is indifferent between holding all tokens or no
tokens.28 If, furthermore, maxj q
j
t is constant over time, then the model is formally identical
to the one just solved. The only difference is its interpretation: in every period a different
developer (the most productive in that period) may purchase tokens and contribute to the
development of the platform.
Contrary to the case considered in the body of the text, now the existence of a market for
tokens generates an allocative efficiency: the most productive developer works on the project
in every period. Of course, as we already saw, this developer contributes to the project only
with some probability. It follows that holding an ICO has an additional benefit because it
allows the most productive developer to contribute to the project in every period. Absent
the ICO, instead, the initial developer will set high effort and investment in every period,
but this developer may not be the most productive developer who could work on the project.
If instead some developers are “poor” (i.e., the cash constraint may be binding), then
the most productive developer in a given period may not have enough resources to purchase
tokens and/or invest efficiently. The identity of the developer that, in every period, develops
the platform (with some probability) depends partly on productivity and partly on wealth.
7 Conclusion
An attentive reader may have noticed a troubling aspect of the model. In equilibrium, the
developer earns positive profits, users enjoy the full surplus generated by the platform, while
at the same time investors are left indifferent. This implies that the sum of the players’
payoffs exceeds the social surplus generated by the creation of the platform. While this
result is correct, it is an artifact of the partial-equilibrium nature of the model. In a general
equilibrium framework, from period T onward, introducing the token increases the supply
of money in the economy by an amount equal to the value of the stock of tokens (which
28 Suppose not: then the best developer strictly prefers to hold all tokens and exert the maximum level
of effort and investment in the following period. However, in that case, this developer’s contribution to the
protocol should already be accounted for in the current price, which implies that he strictly prefers to sell
all of his tokens, leading to a contradiction.
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is also the developer’s profits), leading to an increase in the economy-wide price level.29
Initial holders of cash are therefore made worse off by the introduction of the token. In this
general-equilibrium framework, the developer should anticipate that an increase in the value
of the decentralized digital platform will lead to an increase both of the price of the token
and of the economy-wide price level, therefore reducing the benefit of exerting effort and
developing the protocol (relative to the partial-equilibrium case considered in the body of
the paper.) Also, in general equilibrium, before period T the investment in tokens reduces
the amount invested in the risk-free asset, therefore increasing its return. This implies that
the developer’s effort increases the return demanded by investors for holding tokens. The
effect of the developer’s effort on the economy-wide price level and on the risk-free return is,
however, likely to be negligible and hence a partial-equilibrium analysis seems appropriate.
During the writing of the first version of this paper, there was a robust debate relative
to whether tokens such as the ones studied in this paper (i.e., those associated with a de-
centralized digital platform, sometimes called utility tokens) should be considered securities,
and hence subject to security regulation. Over the past few years most regulatory bodies
started considering tokens associated with decentralized digital platform in the early devel-
opment stage as securities, while tokens associated with decentralized digital platform that
are already sufficiently functional as not securities.30 The model suggests that the price of
the token is less volatile and less dependent on the developer’s actions after period T than
before period T . Because period T marks the end of the development of the platform, the
model provides support to the current regulatory stance.
The model abstracts away from competition, either from other open-source blockchain-
based protocols or traditional companies. In ongoing work (Canidio, 2020), I consider a
simplified version of the model presented here, in which multiple developers can hold ICOs
and enter the market. In that model, the fact that developers hold an ICO (instead of using
their own resources) encourages other developers to also hold ICOs and enter the market.
29 For general equilibrium models in which the economy-wide price level depends on the presence of a
cryptocurrency (Bitcoin), see Schilling and Uhlig (2019) and Garratt and Wallace (2018).
30 For example, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not consider Bitcoin nor
ETH securities, on the ground that, at this point, “there is no central party whose ef-
forts are a key determining factor in the enterprise” (see https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/14/
bitcoin-and-ethereum-are-not-securities-but-some-cryptocurrencies-may-be-sec-official-says.html accessed
on July 24, 2020). However, recent ICOs of tokens associated with platforms at a very early development stage
have been prosecuted (see the case of Telegram’s ICOs - https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212
accessed on July 24, 2020). In most cases, this simply implies that it is not possible to sell tokens at ICO to
people residing in the US.
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Hence, despite the fact that ICOs weaken incentives, they also stimulate competition. Under
some conditions, ICOs are welfare improving (relative to a situation in which the development
of the platform is fully self financed).
The timing of the ICO is also likely to be affected by competition (an aspect not studies
in Canidio, 2020). Remember that, in the model, users enjoy the full surplus generated by
the protocol. Hence, a competing open-source blockchain-based protocol (or a traditional
company) can attract users only if it can generate a higher surplus, either by providing a
better technological solution or by attracting a larger user base. This could affect the timing
of the ICO. If there are “winner takes all” dynamics and network effects, it is conceivable
that the developer will want to anticipate the ICO, so as to build a sufficiently large user
base and prevent the entrance of competitors. However, assuming that the source code is
disclosed at ICO, holding an ICO earlier also gives the opportunity for competitors to copy
the code and imitate some features. The full treatment of this case is left for future work.
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A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider period t such that to ≤ t < T . Defined the expected future
normalized price of tokens in period t < s < T as p˜s =
E[ps]
Rs−t
.
If the expected future normalized price of tokens is strictly increasing anytime between
t and T , then the demand for tokens is not defined in some periods, which cannot be an
equilibrium. If the expected future normalized price for tokens is strictly decreasing over
time but never increasing, then there is a period in which the expected future normalized
price for tokens achieves a maximum. In this period, the demand for tokens from investors is
zero, which implies that the maximum expected future normalized price for tokens between
t and T must be zero. This is a contradiction because if the maximum expected future
normalized price is zero, then the sequence of expected future normalized prices is constant
at zero.
Hence, in every period t ≤ T , in equilibrium the sequence of expected future normalized
prices must be constant. We can therefore write the expected future normalized price as
p˜t = E[p˜T ]. Since the sequence of effort and investment from period 1 to t is known, the
expectation is taken exclusively with respect to the future sequence of investments and effort,
leading to equation (4).
Proof of Lemma 2. By the envelope theorem and Lemma 1, we can compute
∂U˜(Qt)
∂Qt
= f(e∗(Qt), i
∗(Qt)).
For Qt such that both e
∗(Qt) and i
∗(Qt) are constant, we have that
∂U˜(Qt)
∂Qt
is constant. For
Qt such that either e
∗(Qt) or i
∗(Qt) are strictly increasing, we have that
∂U˜(Qt)
∂Qt
is strictly
increasing. By assumption, there are Qt ≤ M such that either e∗(Qt) or i∗(Qt) are strictly
increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1. I first show that the equilibrium in period T − 1 is indeed in mixed
strategies. I then use this fact to show that the equilibrium in all periods t ∈ {to+1, ..., T−1}
is in mixed strategies.
Consider the choice of QT in period T − 1. As already discussed in the body of the text,
the developer’s problem has a corner solution: depending on pT−1, the developer will either
sell all of his tokens (and earn QT−1pT−1βR), purchase as many tokens as possible (and earn
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βU˜(M)− (M −QT−1)pT−1βR), or be indifferent between these two options. Using the fact
that βR = 1, the price at which the developer is indifferent is:
RpT−1 =
U˜T (M)
M
=
VT−1 + f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
M
− (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
, (11)
where VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
M
is the period T price in case the developer holds M tokens at the
beginning of period T .
As already discussed in the body of the text, we have an anti-coordination problem
between investors and the developer, which implies that the unique equilibrium is in mixed
strategy: the price will be such that the developer is indifferent, and the developer will
randomize between QT = 0 and QT = M . More precisely, if the developer sells all of his
tokens in period T − 1, then the price in period T will be VT−1
M
. If instead the developer
purchases M tokens in period T − 1, then pT = VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
M
. Because investors must
be indifferent between purchasing in period T or period T − 1, it must be that:
RpT−1 =
VT−1
M
+ (1− αT−1)f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
M
,
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all of his tokens in period T −1, which
using (11) can be written as:
αT−1 =
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
Therefore, in equilibrium, in period T − 1 the developer is indifferent between selling all
of his tokens or keeping all of his tokens. It follows that I can write:
U˜T−1(QT−1) = max
eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−1 −
e2T−1
2
+Qt−1 · pT−1
}
,
that is, I can write the utility in period T − 1 assuming that the developer sells all of his
tokens in period T−1. This immediately implies that the problem in period T−2 is identical
to the problem in period T − 1. That is, in period T − 2 the developer is indifferent between
QT−1 = 0 and QT−1 = M whenever
RpT−2 =
U˜T−1(M)
M
=
VT−2 + f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
M
− (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
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and investors are indifferent between purchasing in period T − 2 or T − 1 whenever
RpT−1 =
VT−2
M
+ (1− αT−2)f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
M
.
Using the above two expression to solve for αT−2 we again get
αT−2 = αT−1 =
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
The statement of the proposition follows by applying the same argument recursively to
all periods after the ICO.
Proof of Proposition 2. Again, in equilibrium, investors must be indifferent, and therefore,
for any number of tokens sold at ICO, it must be that pto =
pto+1
R
. Hence, whenever to < T ,
the developer’s problem at ICO can be written as:
max
Qto+1
{
(M −Qto+1)pto + βU˜to+1(Qto+1)
}
=
max
Qto+1
{
(M −Qto+1)
pto+1
R
+ β max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}}
≤
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
β ·Qto+1 · pto+1 − β ·
1
2
e2to+1 − β · ito+1 + (M −Qto+1)
pto+1
R
}}
=
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
βM · pto+1 − β
1
2
e2to+1 − βito+1
}
= βU˜to+1(M),
where the first and the last equality follow from writing U˜to+1(Qto+1) explicitly.
31 The devel-
oper therefore anticipates that the price of tokens at ICO will be proportional to the price
of tokens in the following period, independently from how many token he sells at ICO. The
number of tokens sold, however, determines the equilibrium level of effort and investment
in period to+1, and hence the price both at ICO and in the following period. This price is
maximized when no tokens are sold at ICO, and hence effort and investment in period to+1
are at their maximum level.
Proof or Proposition 4. I follow the same steps described in the proof of Proposition 1. First,
I consider period T − 1, derive optimal effort and investment and show that the equilibrium
31 Remember that in every post ICO period the developer is indifferent between selling all his tokens or
holding all tokens. Hence the utility in period to + 1 is equal to the utility the developer earns if he sells all
of his tokens in period to+1 and never purchases them again.
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must be in mixed strategy. Then, I argue that the equilibrium in all periods t ∈ {to +
1, ..., T − 2} is identical to that in period T − 1.
Period-T effort and investment are:
e∗T (QT , AT ) ≡


QT
M
if iT ≥ i
0 otherwise
(12)
i∗T (QT , AT ) ≡

i if i ≤
1
2
(
QT
M
)2
and i ≤ AT
0 otherwise.
(13)
Define:
Qˆ ≡M
√
2¯i, (14)
so that the developer invests whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and will not invest otherwise.
Note that, by (A2), we have Qˆ < M . Given this, it is immediate to check that UT (QT , AT )
is strictly convex in QT whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and is otherwise linear in QT .
UT (QT , AT ) is linearly increasing in AT with slope 1 (corresponding to the marginal utility
of consumption), and has an upward discontinuity at AT = i if and only if QT ≥ Qˆ.
Consider now the choice of QT in period T − 1. For a given market price pT−1, the
developer’s utility as a function of QT is:
32
βUT (QT , AT ) + λT−1(AT−1 − iT−1 − pT−1 max {QT −QT−1, 0}).
where λT−1 is the Lagrange multiplier of the cash constraint, AT are the assets available at
the beginning of period T :
AT = R (AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1) ,
32 The utility in period T − 1 also depends on effort exerted in that period, which is sunk when QT is
chosen.
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and therefore
UT (QT , AT ) =

QT
VT−1
M
+ 1
2
(
QT
M
)2
+ AT−1R + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1R− iT−1R− i if QT ≥ Qˆ
and R(AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1) ≥ i
QT
VT−1
M
+ AT−1R + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1R− iT−1R otherwise,
(15)
Define Q∗T as the largest QT such that the developer can invest i in period T : that is,
the largest QT such that AT = R (AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1) is at least i:
Q∗T ≡ QT−1 −
iT−1 + iR
−1 − AT−1
pT−1
(16)
Note that there are three possibilities:
1. Q∗T may be greater than M , in which case, for given pT−1, the developer is able to hold
on to the entire stock of tokens and still invest i in the following period.
2. Q∗T > 0 may not exist, which implies that, at a given pT−1, it is not possible for the
developer to raise enough to then invest i
3. for given PT−1, Q
∗
T ∈ [0,M ]. In this case, note that if the developer sets QT = Q∗T
then AT = R (AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1) = i, which implies that QT = Q∗T
satisfies the period T − 1 cash constrain.
Note also that if R(AT−1 − iT−1) ≥ i, then for given investment in period T − 1, the
developer’s remaining funds are sufficient to invest in period T . In this case Q∗T ≥ QT−1,
that is, the developer can purchase additional tokens on the market and still be able to
invest in period T . Hence, we must be either in case 1 or 3 above. On the other hand, when
R(AT−1 − iT−1) < i (i.e. the developer’s remaining funds are insufficient to invest in period
T ), then necessarily Q∗T < QT−1: the developer needs to sell some token in period T − 1 in
order to invest in period T . Hence, we must be either in case 2 or 3 above.
In the above derivations, pT−1 is taken as given. In equilibrium, however, the price
of tokens in every period is endogenous and depends on the investors beliefs about the
developer’s behavior. By using the fact pT−1 depends on QT , I can derive the equilibrium of
the game. It turns out, that there are three possible equilibria.
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“high” equilibrium (Q∗T ≥ M) This case is identical to the “rich developer” case. The
developer’s continuation value is strictly increasing, and strictly convex for QT ≥ Qˆ. Again,
in equilibrium the developer randomizes between QT = 0 and QT = M .
For the developer to be indifferent, it must be that:
pT−1R =
UT (M,AT )
M
=
1
M
(
VT−1 +
1
2
− i
)
(17)
For investors to be indifferent, the developer should sell all his tokens with probability αT−1
such that
pT−1R = αT−1
VT−1
M
+ (1− αT−1)VT−1 + 1
M
=
VT−1
M
+
1− αT−1
M
(18)
Putting the above two expressions together we get:
αT−1 =
1
2
+ i
This is indeed an equilibrium if:
Q∗T = QT−1 −
iT−1 + iR
−1 − AT−1
1
MR
(
VT−1 +
1
2
− i) ≥M
or (
VT−1 +
1
2
− i
)(
1− QT−1
M
)
≤ R(AT−1 − iT−1)− i (19)
Note that the above is possible only if R(AT−1 − iT−1) > i, that is, the developer does not
need to sell tokens on the market in period T − 1 to be able to invest in period T .
“low” equilibrium (either Q∗T > 0 does not exist or Q
∗
T < Qˆ) In this case, there is no QT
for which there will be positive effort and investment in the future. The equilibrium price is
pT−1R = pT =
VT−1
M
.
At such price, we have
Q∗T ≡ QT−1 −
iT−1 + iR
−1 − AT−1
VT−1
MR
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which always exist but may be negative. Because Qˆ > 0, then, the “low” equilibrium exists
if and only if Q∗T < Qˆ, which using (14) and (16), becomes:
VT−1
(
QT−1
1M
−
√
2¯i
)
< i+R(iT−1 − AT−1). (20)
Note that the above equilibrium can exist only if R(AT−1−iT−1) < i, that is, if the developer
does not sell tokens in period T − 1 he will be unable to invest in period T .
QT
UT
(
QT ,
(
AT−1 + (M − QT ) · pT − iT−1
))
Q∗TQˆ M
Fig. 4: Continuation value as a function of QT .
“medium” equilibrium (Q∗T ∈ [Qˆ,M ]) In this case, the previous discussion implies that
the continuation value
UT (QT , R (AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1)) ,
is strictly convex in QT for Qt ∈ [Qˆ, Q∗T ] and is linearly increasing in QT for Qt 6∈ [Qˆ, Q∗T ].
Furthermore, if Qˆ < Q∗T then the continuation value has a downward discontinuity at Q
∗
T
(see Figure 4). The argument presented for the “rich developer” case applies here as well:
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the only possible equilibrium is one in which the developer randomizes between QT = 0 and
QT = Q
∗
T . For the developer to be indifferent, it must be that:
pT−1R =
UT (Q
∗
T , i¯)
Q∗T
=
VT−1
M
+
Q∗T
2M2
− i
Q∗T
(21)
For investors to be indifferent, the developer should sell all his tokens with probability αT−1
such that
pT−1R = αT−1
VT−1
M
+ (1− αT−1)
(
VT−1
M
+
Q∗T
M2
)
(22)
Putting the above two expressions together we get:
αT−1 =
1
2
+ i
(
M
Q∗
)2
By using (16) and (21), we can express Q∗T as:
Q∗T = QT−1 −
i+R(iT−1 − AT−1)
VT−1
M
+
Q∗
T
2M2
− i
Q∗
T
(23)
Hence, such “medium” equilibrium exists if and only if the solution to the above equation is
in [Qˆ,M ].
A few relevant observations:
• it is easy to check that, the RHS of (23) is below its LHS at Q∗T = Qˆ if and only if
(20) holds. At the same time the RHS of (23) is above its LHS at Q∗T = M if and only
if (19) holds.
• by continuity, a “medium” equilibrium must exist whenever both (20) and (19) hold.
A “medium” equilibrium must exist also when neither (20) nor (19) hold.
• In all other cases, such “medium’ equilibrium may not exist. However, either a “low”
or a “high” equilibrium will exist.
• R(AT−1 − iT−1) ≥ i, then the LHS of (23) is strictly increasing while its RHS is
strictly decreasing. Furthermore, we established earlier that, in this case, (20) must be
violated. Hence, a unique “medium” equilibrium exists if (19) is violated.
• R(AT−1 − iT−1) < i . In this case, both the RHS and the LHS of (23) are strictly
increasing. Furthermore, we established earlier that (19) must be violated. Hence,
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if (20) is also violated, then there must be at least one “medium” equilibrium. If
instead (20) holds (so that a “low” equilibrium exists) there could still be one (or
more) “medium” equilibrium.
Hence, an equilibrium always exists. If R(AT−1 − iT−1) ≥ i, there can be either a “high”
or a “medium” equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium is unique. If R(AT−1 − iT−1) < i,
there can be multiple equilibria: there can be both a low and multiple medium equilibria.
Finally, to derive the equilibrium in previous periods, I employ the same argument pre-
sented in the proof of Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the developer’s continuation utility is
equal to the utility he would get if he was to sell all his tokens in period T − 1. In previous
periods, therefore, the developer will behave as if his last period of development was T − 1.
Optimal effort and investment in period T − 1 are, again, given by (12) and (13). But
then, the equilibrium in period T − 2 when choosing QT−1 is again in mixed strategy, and is
identical to the one derived earlier. A recursive argument implies that, in every period post-
ICO, the developer will behave as if the following period was the last period of development.
Hence, the set of equilibria is the same in every post-ICO period.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 4 implies that, from period to view point, the developer’s
continuation utility is equal to the utility he would earn if he was to sell all his tokens in
period to+1 and never purchase them again. This implies that optimal effort and investment
in period to + 1 are given, again, by (9) and (10). Also here, I define
Qˆ ≡M
√
2¯i,
as the minimum token holdings such that the developer will want to invest.
At ICO, the developer chooses Qto+1 (i.e., the amount of tokens not to sell) so to maximize
βUto+1 (Qto+1, R (Ato + (M −Qto+1) · pto − ito)) .
There are two important differences with respect to the sale of tokens on the market (consid-
ered in the proof of Proposition 4). First, here the period-to cash constraint is not binding,
the reason being that at ICO the developer is, by definition, a net seller. Second, when
selling on the market, the developer takes as given the price of tokens (which depends on
investor’s expectations relative to his future effort). At ICO, instead, the price of tokens is
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set after the developer announces how many tokens to sell. Hence, because pto+1 = Rpto ,
then the price at which the developer can sell his tokens (either at ICO or in the following
period) reacts to the number of tokens sold.
When choosing how many tokens to sell, the developer maximizes:33
βUto (Qto+1, R (Ato + (Qto −Qto+1) · pto − ito)) =


M · pto − 12
(
Qto+1
M
)2
+ (Ato − ito)− βi if Qto+1 ≥ Qˆ
and Ato + (M −Qto+1) · pto − iT−1 ≥ iR−1
M
VT−1
MRT−to
+AT−1 − iT−1 otherwise
(24)
where
pto =
1
RT−to
(
Vto
M
+
Qto+1
M2
)
.
is the price at ICO in case there is positive investment and effort in the following period (but
no investment nor effort afterward). Instead, VT−1
MRT−to−1
is the price of tokens in period to+1
assuming no effort nor investment in period to + 1 and in all subsequent periods.
It is easy to check that the above continuation value is strictly increasing in Qto+1 as long
as the developer will be able to invest in the following period. That is, anticipating that the
amount of tokens not sold increases the price at which the developer can sell his tokens, the
developer will want to sell fewer tokens possible. The optimal Qto+1 therefore is the largest
solution to
Ato +
(M −Qto+1)
RT−to
·
(
Vto
M
+
Qto+1
M2
)
− iT−1 = iR−1
If this solution is greater or equal to M if and only if Ato − iT−1 ≥ iR−1. In this case,
then the developer will set Qto+1 = M (i.e., he will not sell any token at ICO).
If instead Ato − iT−1 < iR−1, then the largest solution to the above equation will be
lower than M (if it exist). If it does not exist or is below Qˆ, then it is not possible to raise
sufficient funds at ICO so to able to invest in the following period. In this case, the developer
is indifferent between any Qto+1 ≤ M . If instead the largest solution to the above equation
is in [Qˆ,M ], then it will be the equilibrium.
33 Again, I use the fact that the developer’s continuation utility in period to + 1 is equal to his payoff in
case he sells all his tokens in that period.
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